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Note
Guardians of Your Galaxy S7: Encryption
Backdoors and the First Amendment
Allen Cook Barr*
On December 2, 2015, two armed individuals killed four1
teen people in San Bernardino, California. In the aftermath of
the shooting, investigators began looking into evidence they
could obtain from the shooters’ electronic devices. However,
2
when they did so, they were met with a roadblock: encryption.
3
4
Encryption is everywhere, from toasters to televisions. En5
cryption is the key to privacy in the digital era; it makes secure
6
online banking, trading, and purchasing possible. The use of
* CIPP/US; J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School;
B.A. Physics & Philosophy, Drake University. Thank you to Professor Richard
Frase, Anna Luczkow, and Jerome Borden for their feedback, comments, and
suggestions. Additional thanks to Professor Christopher Soper and Professor
Jennifer McCrickerd for their guidance in developing my writing and analytical skills. Finally, thank you to my friends and family for their support, both
as I was writing this Note and throughout my life. Copyright © 2016 by Allen
Cook Barr.
1. Adam Nagourney et al., San Bernardino Shooting Kills at Least 14;
Two Suspects Are Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/12/03/us/san-bernardino-shooting.html.
2. See Pierre Thomas, Feds Challenged by Encrypted Devices of San Bernardino Attackers, ABC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/US/feds
-challenged-encrypted-devices-san-bernardino-attackers/story?id=35680875.
3. Cf. Chris Orr, Hacking the Internet of Things: Beware of the Toasters,
TRIPWIRE: THE STATE OF SECURITY (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.tripwire.com/
state-of-security/risk-based-security-for-executives/connecting-security-to-the
-business/hacking-the-internet-of-things-beware-of-the-toasters (noting that
hackers may soon target appliances such as toasters).
4. See Leo Kelion, Samsung’s Smart TVs Fail To Encrypt Voice Commands, BBC (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31523497.
5. See Privacy in the Digital Age: Encryption and Mandatory Access:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Prop.
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 4 (1998) [hereinafter
Privacy in the Digital Age] (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Member,
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, & Prop. Rights of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary).
2
6. 1.7 Why Is Cryptography Important?, EMC , http://www.emc.com/emc
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encryption, however, comes with law enforcement costs. While
encryption may make it impossible for a criminal to hack your
bank account, it may also make it impossible for law enforcement to gain access to that criminal’s information, even after a
8
court has held that such access is a lawful search and seizure.
In response to these issues, law enforcement personnel have
sought to push technology companies towards implementing
tools that would allow them to bypass encryption when needed
9
as part of an investigation. Technology companies on the other
10
hand, spurred by the Edward Snowden revelations of 2013,
have been very reluctant to comply, fearing the backlash of cus11
tomer reaction they believe would accompany it. Thus, rather
than seeking voluntary assistance from software developers,
some individuals in law enforcement have begun to push for
legislation on so-called “encryption backdoors,” tools that would
12
provide for government access to encrypted communications.
The call for encryption backdoors raises a significant First
Amendment issue. Originally debated in the mid-to-late 1990s,
computer source code is arguably First Amendment protected
13
speech. Indeed, several cases in the 1990s challenged export
control restrictions on computer source code as unconstitutional

-plus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/why-is-cryptography-important.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2016).
7. Privacy in the Digital Age, supra note 5, at 1 (statement of Sen. John
Ashcroft, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Prop.
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
8. Matt Apuzzo et al., Apple and Other Tech Companies Tangle with U.S.
over Data Access, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
09/08/us/politics/apple-and-other-tech-companies-tangle-with-us-over-access-to
-data.html (describing how Apple indicated it could not turn over iMessages
even after a court ordered it to do so).
9. See id.
10. Snowden Surveillance Archive, CANADIAN JOURNALISTS FOR FREE EXPRESSION, https://snowdenarchive.cjfe.org/greenstone/cgi-bin/library.cgi (last
visited Oct. 12, 2016).
11. See Apuzzo et al., supra note 8.
12. See, e.g., J. David Goodman, New York City Police Commissioner Says
Attacks Will Force Changes in Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www
.nytimes.com/live/paris-attacks-live-updates/bratton-says-attacks-will-force
-law-enforcement-to-change-tactics (quoting the New York City police commissioner as saying encryption access was something that “is going to need to be
debated very quickly”).
13. Cf. Dan L. Burk, Software as Speech, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 683,
691 (1998) (discussing the new problems computer code was creating in the
First Amendment context in the 1990s).
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14

prior restraints on free speech. These cases, however, differ
from modern proposals, which would compel speech by requir15
ing developers to write in encryption backdoors. Although
both courts and commentators have considered whether prior
restraints like those challenged in the export control cases are
constitutional, relatively little analysis has been performed on
when, if ever, compelling software backdoors would satisfy constitutional requirements.
This Note argues that the broad-sweeping encryption
backdoor regimes typically suggested by law enforcement personnel would not satisfy the First Amendment’s prohibition
against compelled speech. Although there may be some legislative or judicial actions the government could take to allow access to some encrypted communications, requiring changes to
the source code for all of a company’s devices is not a permissible response. Part I of this Note provides the technological
background necessary for a basic understanding of how encryption software is written and operates. This Part then reviews
Supreme Court precedent on compelled speech, as well as past
attempts by the government to regulate or otherwise curtail
encryption technologies. Part II examines how current proposals for encryption backdoors implicate compelled speech issues in a way that past attempts to regulate encryption did not.
After distinguishing past attempts from compelled backdoors,
Part II analyzes the arguments for and against protecting
source code, arguing that source code may only be compelled in
the presence of a “clear and present danger,” and that broad
encryption backdoors fail this test. Given that broad backdoors
in all devices are impermissible, Part III offers some possible
solutions that would enable law enforcement to access encrypted information in narrowly tailored circumstances. Although
preliminary, Part III provides two examples of how—for specific individuals—law enforcement could gain access to both
communications and (in the right circumstances) stored encrypted information by working with technology companies.

14. See, e.g., Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal.
1997).
15. See Apuzzo et al., supra note 8.
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I. BACKDOOR’S BACKGROUND: TECHNOLOGICAL AND
LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING ENCRYPTION
BACKDOORS
Encryption regulation embraces several distinct areas of
inquiry: software development, the mathematical mechanics of
encryption, and First Amendment free speech concerns. This
Part provides an overview of the technology involved in encryption backdoors as well as how the courts have addressed regulations of speech similar to encryption backdoors in the past.
A. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND THE MECHANICS OF
ENCRYPTION
A natural starting point for understanding the legal issues
encryption backdoors implicate is the technology itself. The
technological components of encryption can broadly be broken
down into two key areas: the process of creating a computer
application in general and the mathematical underpinnings
that make encryption technologies possible.
1. The Process of Software Development
Broadly speaking, computer programs are sets of instructions that tell the various hardware components of a computer
(processor, random-access memory, display, etc.) to perform a
16
particular action. Each action is itself miniscule, such as “set
17
the pixel located at 917, 229 to color code 7C0019.” However,
the sheer speed with which computers perform individual steps
18
brings these steps together to quickly produce end results.
Understanding the process of translating computer steps from
an idea in the programmer’s mind into instructions interpretable by a computer processor is key to appreciating how encryption backdoors raise First Amendment concerns. Beginning

16. See TONY GADDIS, STARTING OUT WITH
TURES THROUGH OBJECTS 4–6 (7th ed. 2012).

C++: FROM CONTROL STRUC-

17. This would still need to be further broken down into more steps, such
as determining what amount of red, green, and blue produces color 7C0019.
See Jeff Tyson, How LCDs Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS (July 17, 2000), http://
electronics.howstuffworks.com/lcd5.htm.
18. See, e.g., Intel Core i7-4770K, PCMAG (June 1, 2013), http://www
.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2419798,00.asp (reviewing a consumer-grade processor capable of performing thirty-two operations per clock-tick with a clock
speed of 3.5 gigahertz). This leads to a total of over one hundred billion operations per second.
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with the end result of computer programming—the computer
19
application—and working backwards is helpful in this regard.
When most individuals use a computer for a particular
task, they begin by opening the application needed to complete
that task. On its surface, an application may appear to be a
single file; however, an application is really a collection of two
components: machine code (instructions telling the computer
what to do), and resources or assets (content provided by the
application developer for the application to use, such as menu
20
text and button icons). The machine code included with the
application can be interpreted by a computer processor. Machine code, however, is very difficult for a human to read or
21
modify. To aid developers in writing instructions that computers can understand, tools known as compilers have been devel22
oped. Compilers enable developers to write code in a way that
is meaningful to humans (such as “areaOfRectangle =
baseLength * sideHeight”) and then have it translated into ma23
chine code for execution by the computer. This human readable code, known as “source code,” is what developers write in to
express their ideas regarding the steps a computer is to per24
form. Free speech issues come to the forefront at this point. As
content that is meaningful to humans, source code is arguably

19. The steps a computer takes when running the application are not particularly relevant to a discussion of how source code should be treated under
the First Amendment. For a technical discussion of how instructions are given
to computer processors, see generally JOHN L. HENNESSY & DAVID A.
PATTERSON, COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE apps. A-1–A-54 (5th ed. 2012).
20. Glossary, ANDROID DEVELOPERS, https://developer.android.com/guide/
appendix/glossary.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2016).
21. Y. DANIEL LIANG, INTRODUCTION TO JAVA PROGRAMMING 7 (10th ed.
2015). Machine code is literally a string of binary numbers, which are sent as
high and low-voltage electrical impulses to a computer’s components; those
components are then hardwired to respond in a particular way. ERIC
WALKINGSHAW, MACHINE CODE AND HOW THE ASSEMBLER WORKS 6, 8 (Mar.
8–13, 2013), http://web.engr.oregonstate.edu/~walkiner/cs271-wi13/slides/11
-MachineCode.pdf.
22. LIANG, supra note 21, at 8.
23. Id. This is still a massive gloss of how compilers operate. The essential
point is that compilers convert statements in a language understandable by
humans to a language understandable by computers. Id. Different programming languages and computer hardware may have more or fewer steps involved in the process of converting human readable code to machine code. See,
e.g., id. at 16–18 (describing the additional steps Java requires to convert
source code into machine code).
24. GADDIS, supra note 16, at 11.
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25

speech or expressive conduct, and, therefore, government reg26
ulation of it is generally prohibited by the Constitution.
2. AN OVERVIEW OF ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
Fundamentally, there is nothing about computer encryption that could not be accomplished by a human using pencil
27
and paper, given enough time. Indeed, encryption technology
28
dates back to ancient times, and computers have merely allowed increased complexity in encryption methods and the abil29
ity of others to intercept and decrypt messages. What was
once difficult or impossible to decrypt may become possible with
30
advances in technology. As a matter of fact, only one form of
encryption has been shown to be impossible to break, even given infinite time and resources, and its use is generally imprac31
ticable for everyday usage. For all other forms of encryption,
the question is not whether the encryption can be broken, but
32
how long the decryption process will take.

25. This was the main issue of several cases in the 1990s that considered
the legality of the export bans discussed infra Part I.B.1. See, e.g., Bernstein v.
U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (considering
whether export regulation of cryptography suppressed protected expression).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)
(“The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing
speech . . . or even expressive conduct . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also infra
Part II.B (discussing the application of the First Amendment to source code).
27. Cf. RANDALL MUNROE, WHAT IF? 98 (2014) (“[A] human running
through computer chip benchmark calculations by hand, using pencil and paper, can carry out the equivalent of one full instruction every minute and a
half.” (footnote omitted)).
28. Chris Savarese & Brian Hart, The Caesar Cipher, TRINITY C., http://
www.cs.trincoll.edu/~crypto/historical/caesar.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2016).
29. BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 8 (1st ed. 1994).
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id. at 13–14. That one method is a one-time pad. Its operation is fairly
simple: given a secret message (in binary form) and a random “pad” of bits as
long as the message, an XOR operation is performed on each bit of the message with each bit of the pad. So long as the pad is truly random and is never
reused, it cannot be broken. The difficulty in everyday usage is that the two
communicating parties must find some way to securely exchange their pads.
RUBY B. LEE, SECURITY BASICS FOR COMPUTER ARCHITECTS 31 (Mark D. Hill
ed. 2013).
32. See, e.g., Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 695 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 45 (statement of William P. Crowell, Deputy Director, National Security Agency) (“If
all the personal computers in the world—260 million computers—were put to
work on a single PGP-encrypted message, it would still take an estimated 12
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Despite being technically breakable, modern encryption
technologies are still very secure. The encryption program,
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), referenced by the Deputy Director
of the National Security Agency (NSA) provides an excellent
example for explaining how modern encryption software
33
34
works. PGP is a public-key cryptography system. This means
that sending a secret message with it involves the use of two
keys: one to encrypt the message (the public key) and a differ35
ent one to decrypt the message (the private key). Public and
private keys can be thought of as keys to a special kind of vault:
the public key allows any member of the public to put a message in the vault (preventing anyone else from reading it), however, only the private key holder can open the vault and read
36
all the messages that have been placed inside it. More technically, the keys used for public-key encryption are a pair of very
large numbers with particular mathematical properties, such
that someone with the private key can easily decrypt messages
encrypted with the public key. Deducing the private key from
the public key, however, is computationally unfeasible (alt37
hough not theoretically impossible). Software developers have
utilized these properties to write programs that can enable an38
yone to send messages with strong encryption. As a result,
public key encryption software is now widely available to the
consumer public, provided that people know how to use it. Similar tools are also available for encrypting information outside
of the person-to-person communication context and are used in
a variety of applications, including inter alia wireless pass39
words, banking access, and computer file systems.
million times the age of the universe, on average, to break a single message . . . .”).
33. Obviously, the particular encryption scheme used will vary from situation to situation. Public-key encryption is useful for communications, but is
unnecessary for data storage, such as information that is kept on a phone or
computer, but never transmitted. Nevertheless, this public-key encryption example highlights the issues germane to the most common situation in which
encryption problems arise: communications between criminals.
34. PGP CORP., AN INTRODUCTION TO CRYPTOGRAPHY 14 (June 8, 2004),
http://download.pgp.com/pdfs/Intro_to_Crypto_040600_F.pdf.
35. SCHNEIER, supra note 29, at 29.
36. See PGP CORP., supra note 34, at 12–13.
37. SCHNEIER, supra note 29, at 29.
38. See, e.g., GPGTOOLS (Sept. 24, 2015), https://gpgtools.org (providing a
download to easily add PGP encryption to Mac OS X e-mail).
39. See, e.g., Milan Broz, LUKS: Linux Unified Key Setup, CRYPTSETUP
(Sept. 5, 2016), https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/blob/master/README
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So how does one go about bypassing encryption? Other
than simply asking the target (or their acquaintances) for the
40
password, which is likely to be a nonstarter, law enforcement
typically has four options: keyloggers, backdoors, brute-force
41
attacks, and implementation flaws. Keyloggers are straightforward: they are a piece of either hardware attached to the device or software running on the device which logs every key
42
press. The key presses are then either transmitted or the device eventually removed, and reviewed to find the encryption
key. Backdoors are similarly conceptually simple, although
from a public perception standpoint there is disagreement on
43
what constitutes a backdoor. As used herein (and in general
by those in the technology industry), a backdoor is any modification to the encryption (whether for good, benign, or nefarious
purposes) intended to enable access to the encrypted information by someone that does not have knowledge of the encryp44
tion key. Brute-force attacks are simply guessing passwords
45
until the correct one is found. Given the complexity of pass46
words, however, this typically is not practicable. Finally, implementation flaws are flaws inherent in how encryption is implemented, such that even when used correctly, the key can be
47
exposed. By their very nature, implementation flaws will vary
48
from one implementation of encryption to the next.

.md (last updated June 4, 2016) (describing LUKS, a whole-disk encryption
program for Linux operating systems).
40. Unless the target is granted immunity, compulsion would violate the
Fifth Amendment. See infra notes 176–83 and accompanying text.
41. See Declan McCullagh, Feds Seek New Ways To Bypass Encryption,
CNET (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.cnet.com/news/feds-seek-new-ways-to
-bypass-encryption (providing examples of each).
42. Spyware.Keylogger, SYMANTEC (Feb. 13, 2007), https://www.symantec
.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-033116-4256-99&tabid=2.
43. See Mario Trujillo, The Slippery Definition of Encryption ‘Back Doors,’
THE HILL (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/269733
-the-sliding-definition-of-encryption-backdoors.
44. See id.
45. McCullagh, supra note 41.
46. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. But see Michele Mosca,
Cybersecurity in an Era with Quantum Computers: Will We Be Ready? 1, 1
(2015), https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1075.pdf (noting that the advent of quantum computers may make brute forcing current encryption methods possible).
47. See McCullagh, supra note 41 (describing when computers decrypt a
file system, the key is stored in the random access memory, and can potentially be accessed by computer forensics experts).
48. For example, in an effort to make Wi-Fi setup easier, the WPS protocol allows clients to connect by using an eight-digit pin with particular proper-
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To summarize the technological discussion, there are a
wide variety of methods by which law enforcement could attempt to access encrypted information. Source code speech issues arise only in the context of backdoors, because only they
require modification of the written work of a developer or developers. Nevertheless, such backdoors are attractive, because
of the limitations of other access methods (one must have access to install a keylogger, brute forcing may be computationally impracticable, and an implementation flaw may not exist).
As a result, seeking to implement backdoors is a natural step
for law enforcement to take to increase their informationgathering abilities.
B. A HISTORY OF ENCRYPTION REGULATIONS AND THE LIMITS
ON THEM
In light of public availability of cryptography technology,
as well as explosion of its usage in modern communications, the
government has sought to regulate the dissemination of en49
cryption technology. Though laws regulating encryption tech50
nology predate modern computer equipment, it was not until
the 1990s that those laws were first challenged under the First
51
Amendment. Changes in the law in the early 2000s abruptly
52
ended this debate, at least in the courtroom setting. As a result, the extent to which limitations on the dissemination of encryption technology source code are permissible is still an open

ties. This dramatically reduces the universe of passwords to a mere 11,000
possibilities, and as a result of this implementation flaw, brute force attacks
are possible. Stefan Viehböck, Brute Forcing Wi-Fi Protected Setup,
WORDPRESS 4, 6 (Dec. 26, 2011), https://sviehb.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/
viehboeck_wps.pdf (describing how the implementation flaw makes brute-force
attacks possible); Reaver-WPS-Fork-T6x, GITHUB, https://github.com/t6x/
reaver-wps-fork-t6x (last updated Sept. 26, 2016) (providing a download for
software to execute the WPS brute-force attack).
49. Whitfield Diffie & Susan Landau, The Export of Cryptography in the
20th and the 21st Centuries, in THE HISTORY OF INFORMATION SECURITY 725,
726–28 (Karl de Leeuw & Jan Bergstra eds., 2007).
50. Id.
51. See Norman Andrew Crain, Bernstein, Karn, and Junger: Constitutional Challenges to Cryptographic Regulations, 50 ALA. L. REV. 869, 876–84
(1999) (discussing 1990s challenges to cryptographic regulations under the
First Amendment).
52. See Diffie & Landau, supra note 49, at 732–33. At that point in time,
encryption export was substantially deregulated, mooting challenges to limits
on exportation. See id.
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question. This Section introduces both past and present attempts to regulate encryption.
1. Past Legislative Responses to Encryption
Software backdoors would not be the government’s first
foray into the regulation of encryption technologies. Rather,
since the Second World War (WWII), the government has restricted the exportation of encryption technologies to other
53
countries on the basis that they were weapons. More recently
in the early 1990s, Congress attempted to entice companies to
install hardware backdoors into all their communications products in an effort to gain the ability to easily intercept an elec54
tronic communication.
Following WWII, cryptography was primarily a military
55
technology. As a result, each individual cryptographic device
56
required an individual export license. This policy continued
through the end of the Cold War, at which point the NSA began
approving the exportation of products utilizing encryption keys
57
of limited length. This loosening of restrictions did little to
abate business pressure for the ability to export stronger encryption, and, in September of 1999, the government did away
with most encryption-related export restrictions on retail prod58
ucts.
In addition to export controls, in the early 1990s, the government sought to shape domestic use of encryption by propos59
ing a device known as the Clipper Chip. Framing the chip’s
implementation as voluntary, the government pushed companies to use the Clipper Chip as the means for embedding en-

53. Id. at 728.
54. Steven Levy, Battle of the Clipper Chip, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/12/magazine/battle-of-the-clipper-chip.html.
55. Diffie & Landau, supra note 49, at 728.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 729. Specifically, the NSA permitted keys of up to forty-bit
length. Id. To put this in perspective, “an increase of one bit doubles the cost to
the intruder,” id., and today the industry standard for Internet communications is 2048-bit keys. Liam Tung, Google Strips Chrome, Android Trust for
Symantec Root Certificate, ZDNET (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/
article/google-strips-chrome-android-trust-for-symantec-root-certificate. Thus,
604
modern Internet communications are approximately 3*10 times more difficult to crack than those that were secured by the Clipper Chip.
58. Diffie & Landau, supra note 49, at 732–33.
59. Levy, supra note 54.
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60

cryption into their products. The key, however (pun intended),
was that, in addition to the chip containing the encryption key
used by the parties to communicate, each Clipper Chip would
encrypt each message with a second encryption key, kept by the
61
government. When authorized by a court order, the government could then easily intercept communications between any
62
Clipper Chip-equipped devices. Unfortunately for the govern63
ment, the Clipper Chip never gained traction. A combination
of exposed security flaws in the chip, as well as the release of
other tools based on open source encryption, shut down the
64
Clipper Chip before it ever gained widespread use.
2. Present Attempts To Control Encryption
After the fall of the Clipper Chip and the end of significant
export regulation, encryption regulation largely became a nonissue. Since 2000, encryption usage has greatly proliferated,
and in 2014, Apple took public-key encryption software and
65
made it widely available to iPhone users, exactly as described
66
above. As a result, even Apple became unable to access either
information stored on the device or messages sent between two
67
iMessage users. In the wake of this action, the director of the
FBI began calling for congressional action to require that Apple
implement a backdoor that would enable government access to
68
iPhones upon obtaining a court order.
To date, however, no legislation has been introduced which
would require the implementation of such backdoors. On April
13, 2016, however, the chair and vice-chair of the Senate Select
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Sean Gallagher, What the Government Should’ve Learned About
Backdoors from the Clipper Chip, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 14, 2015), http://
arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/12/what-the-government
-shouldve-learned-about-backdoors-from-the-clipper-chip/.
64. Id.
65. Bryan Chaffin, FBI Cranky at Apple for Securing iOS, Only Has Itself
(and NSA) To Blame, MAC OBSERVER (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www
.macobserver.com/tmo/article/fbi-cranky-at-apple-for-securing-ios-only-has
-itself-and-nsa-to-blame.
66. See supra Part I.A.2.
67. Apuzzo et al., supra note 8.
68. Ryan J. Reilly & Matt Sledge, FBI Director Calls on Congress To ‘Fix’
Phone Encryption by Apple, Google, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 16, 2014), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/16/james-comey-phone-encryption_n_
5996808.html.
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Committee on Intelligence did release a piece of draft legislation, which would require a technology company “that receives
a court order from a government for information or data [to] (A)
provide such information or data . . . in an intelligible format;
or (B) provide such technical assistance as is necessary to obtain such information or data in an intelligible format or to
69
achieve the purpose of the court order.” This requirement
would apply to all communications, both foreign and domestic.
Importantly, however, the act would not “authorize any government officer to require or prohibit any specific design or op70
erating system to be adopted by any covered entity.” This limitation would seem to prohibit a law enforcement agency from
demanding a backdoor. Although companies would be required
to assist law enforcement when capable of doing so, the law
would not require companies to change their products across
the board. In other words, if a company could not (in general)
hack their own product, the company would not have to change
the product to make it always hackable, though they would
have to make every attempt to hack a specific device when pro71
vided the device by law enforcement.
In summary, several common strains can be drawn from
various commentary that distinguish current calls for backdoors from the Clipper Chip and export controls of the past.
First, unlike export controls, these backdoors would be applica72
ble even to purely domestic technologies. Second, unlike the

69. Compliance with Court Orders Act of 2016, 114th Cong. § 3(a)(1)
(2016),
http://feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=files.serve&File_id=
5B990532-CC7F-427F-9942-559E73EB8BFB (discussion draft from Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Vice Chairman, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence).
70. Id. § 3(b).
71. Note that this is not the only way to read the bill. Other writers on
encryption and the law have interpreted the text of the bill as requiring
backdoors. See, e.g., Joseph Donoso, Anti-Encryption Bill Is an Affront to Privacy, Technological Security, FREEDOMWORKS (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www
.freedomworks.org/content/anti-encryption-bill-affront-privacy-technological
-security; Riana Pfefferkorn, The Burr-Feinstein Crypto Bill Would Gut Our
Cybersecurity, STAN. LAW. (Apr. 26, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/04/26/
the-burr-feinstein-crypto-bill-would-gut-our-cybersecurity. I do not think this
mandate is clear from the plain language of the draft, particularly given the
“no required design or operating system” provision quoted above. I do agree,
however, that the intent of the bill is likely to require backdoors, and I believe
a clarification on that point will likely be included in a subsequent draft,
should there be one. Such a broad mandate would, I argue infra, be inconsistent with the First Amendment. See infra Part II.C.
72. See Conor Friedersdorf, Is Law Enforcement Crying Wolf About the
Dangers of Locked Phones?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www
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Clipper Chip, including such functionality would not be option73
al. Third, also unlike the Clipper Chip, a modern backdoor
would involve changes to developers’ written product, rather
74
than merely adding additional hardware. As discussed below,
it is this third difference in particular that raises many of the
constitutional issues.
C. FREE SPEECH ISSUES OF FORCING SOFTWARE CHANGES
Software backdoors are not the first instance of encryption
regulations potentially running afoul of the First Amendment.
Rather, in the mid-1990s, both courts and commentators began
considering to what extent the government could regulate the
75
dissemination of source code. At that point in time, however,
the focus was largely on prior restraints of speech, whereas this
Note focuses on limitations of compelled speech. This Section
reviews this discussion to the extent it bears on present day
calls for backdoors.
1. Doctrinal Limitations on Compelling Speech
When discussing First Amendment protection of speech, a
common perspective among commentators is to consider
whether the government is placing limitations on what can be
76
said. Indeed, the relevant text of the amendment—“Congress
77
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech” —
facially suggests only that Congress may not abridge speech,
but provides no explicit prohibition against Congress compelling speech. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has rejected this
78
literal interpretation of the First Amendment and has recog.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/is-law-enforcement-crying-wolf-about
-the-dangers-of-locked-phones/470055.
73. See Reilly & Sledge, supra note 68.
74. See Laura Wagner, Apple CEO Tim Cook: Backdoor to iPhones Would
Be Software Equivalent of Cancer, NPR (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/24/468016377/apple-ceo-tim-cook-back-door-to
-iphones-would-be-software-equivalent-of-cancer (quoting Apple’s CEO as saying the only way to implement the backdoor desired would be to write software).
75. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D.
Cal. 1977).
76. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE AMERICAN FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ix–x (4th ed. 2011) (showing a table of
contents containing only one chapter on compelled speech and six chapters on
other facets of First Amendment speech protection).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
78. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telcomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
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nized that the First Amendment also prohibits the state from
79
compelling an individual or organization to speak.
The Constitution provides a range of standards to apply
when evaluating regulation of speech. The highest level, “the
most exacting scrutiny,” applies “to regulations that suppress,
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content,” while “regulations that are unrelated to
the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of
80
scrutiny.” When strict scrutiny applies, the regulation of
speech must be (1) “narrowly tailored” (2) “to a compelling state
81
interest.” Finally, regulations on content “worthless or of de
82
minimis value to society” receive only minimal scrutiny. What
level of standard to apply is the first step in determining what,
if any, protection applies to a particular piece of speech.
In addition to these general principles, over the years, the
Court has articulated several points of guidance regarding
compelled speech that are relevant to mandating encryption
backdoors. The first recognition of First Amendment protection
from compelled speech came in 1943, when the Court held that
“involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even
83
more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.” Such
grounds are present “only when the expression presents a clear
and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered
84
to prevent and punish.” In 1977, the Court recognized both
that the state’s interest must be “sufficiently compelling” to
85
make compelled speech permissible, and that one cannot be
compelled to “contribute to the support of an ideological cause
86
he may oppose.” Finally, in 1995, the Court recognized that “a
narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of

U.S. 727, 739–40 (1996) (rejecting the application of “literal[ ] categorical
standards” in favor of “continual development” based on “new circumstances”).
79. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) (holding that the standard for compelling speech is even higher than that for censoring it).
80. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
81. Id. at 680 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
82. Yvonne C. Ocrant, Comment, A Constitutional Challenge to Encryption Export Regulations: Software Is Speechless, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 503, 519–
20 (1998) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 400 (1992) (White,
J., concurring)).
83. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. at 633.
84. Id.
85. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977).
86. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977).
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87

constitutional protection.” Thus, a mandated expression may
be something other than literal speech, and in such cases a
mandate is impermissible unless there is a clear and present
88
danger.
Though the preceding discussion focuses on political or ideological statements, the Court has also been clear that the First
Amendment’s protection also prohibits compelled speech in
89
non-political contexts, albeit with a caveat not applicable to
compelled software backdoors: commercial speech, or speech
that “does no more than propose a commercial transaction,” re90
ceives less protection than other forms of expression. Thus,
under the commercial speech doctrine, the government may re91
quire nutritional information, warnings, or disclaimers on
92
products. Such a carve out is not applicable to software backdoors, however, because they do considerably more than “pro93
pose a commercial transaction.”
In summary, the First Amendment provides various levels
of protection for speech, depending on the character of the
speech. That protection extends not just to limits on speech, but
also to laws that would compel speech. Finally, an act need not
be literal speech to be protected.
2. Past Arguments on the Free Speech Status of Source Code
Around the same time that the Clipper Chip program was
developing, both courts and commentators had begun considering whether the First Amendment protects computer source
94
code as speech. Although this question was never definitively
87. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995) (finding seclection of parade participants to be protected by the
First Amendment).
88. Professor Cass R. Sunstein has argued that the Court should reconsider the clear and present danger test. Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion: In Face of
Terrorism, Reassessing the First Amendment, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Nov. 29,
2015), http://www.northjersey.com/opinion/opinion-guest-writers/in-the-face-of
-terrorism-reassessing-the-first-amendment-1.1464277. To date, however, the
Supreme Court has not moved in this direction.
89. See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 416 (2001)
(striking down a required contribution to pay for mushroom advertising).
90. Id. at 409.
91. E.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 136
(2d Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of injunction against a law requiring calorie
information in New York restaurants).
92. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492 n.1 (1995).
93. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 409.
94. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D.
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95

settled by the courts, following a series of three cases on the
issue, various commentators developed arguments both in favor
and against protecting source code under the Free Speech
96
Clause of the First Amendment. This Subsection reviews these arguments.
a. Arguments Supporting Free Speech Protection for Source
Code
Prima facie, source code seems worthy of First Amendment
protection. The First Amendment protects expression, and
source code, among other things, allows programmers to express ideas to one another. Source code shares many of its
characteristics with things that have been found to be protect97
ed, such as cookbooks. Both contain, in written form, a mix98
ture of English and numerical instructions. Both may be pub99
lished in a book. Both require some level of training to be able
100
to understand the information they contain. More generally,
101
both contain (what is intended to be) “truthful information.”
Given our country’s historical favoring of the expression of in102
formation, this strongly suggests that source code, like other
forms of technical instructions, should be protected.
Cal. 1997) (noting that Bernstein submitted his program for review in 1992).
95. Compare Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1310–11 (finding export controls
unconstitutional), with Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C.
1996) (upholding export controls as constitutional).
96. See Crain, supra note 51 (summarizing Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d
708 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426,
1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996); and Karn, 925 F. Supp. 1.
97. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2666 (2011) (listing a
ban on the sale of cookbooks as the sort of action prohibited by the First
Amendment).
98. Compare THE GOURMET COOKBOOK 852 (Ruth Reich ed., 2004) (containing instructions on how to make vanilla bean ice cream), with
Captainbowtie, PartAnalysisPane.java, GITHUB (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www
.github.com/captainbowtie/MockStats/blob/MockStats-1-(Swing)/
PartAnalysisPane.java (containing instructions on how to calculate statistics
for a mock trial competitor from information in a referenced database).
99. Compare THE GOURMET COOKBOOK, supra note 98, with GADDIS, supra note 16.
100. Cf. Linda Larsen, How To Read a Baking Recipe, ABOUT FOOD (Oct.
13, 2014), http://www.busycooks.about.com/od/howtobake/a/readabakingreci
.htm (providing instructions on how to read a recipe).
101. Cf. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (rejecting the argument that the government had an interest in restricting the flow
of truthful information to prevent the public from making bad decisions with
that information).
102. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556 (1980)
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At a more technical level, source code meets constitutional
standards to be considered speech. The First Amendment protects both literal speech, spoken and written, as well as “inher103
ently expressive” conduct. Although not all written speech is
104
protected, source code falls within the sphere of protection.
105
Unlike the picketing signs of Giboney or the “White Appli106
cants Only” sign referred to in Rumsfeld, source code is not
speech as a means to some illegal end. Rather, source code is,
at least in some instances, intended primarily to have an expressive purpose, with any “conduct” resulting being merely in107
cidental. Although no court has ever ruled on the issue, The
108
Anarchist Cookbook is likely protected, despite teaching its
109
readers how to make a bomb. So, too, should source code be
protected, even though it may enable its users to prevent the
interception of their communications.
In addition to the expressive nature of source code, some
commentators have advanced an independent “free speech val110
ues” argument. Under this view, because source code facili(plurality opinion) (noting a history of openness).
103. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65–66
(2006) (analyzing whether conduct was inherently expressive after rejecting
the argument that it was literal speech).
104. Id. at 62 (“[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of
speech . . . to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was
in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.” (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490, 502 (1949))).
105. Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502.
106. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62.
107. This leaves open the cases where source code is not intended to be expressive. Additional arguments that source code is still worthy of protection,
even in this instance, are raised in the next paragraph. See also infra Part
III.B (discussing the problems that would arise in trying to assess whether
source code was intended to be expressive on a case-by-case basis).
108. Tony Dokoupil, After Latest Shooting, Murder Manual Author Calls
for Book To Be Taken ‘Immediately’ out of Print, NBC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/after-latest-shooting-murder-manual
-author-calls-book-be-taken-f2D11758543 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). But see Susan Jones, Sen. Feinstein: ‘Anarchist Cookbook’ Not ‘Protected by the First Amendment,’ CNSNEWS.COM (Apr. 3, 2015),
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-jones/sen-feinstein-anarchist-cookbook
-not-protected-first-amendment.
109. WILLIAM POWELL, THE ANARCHIST COOKBOOK 113 (1971).
110. See, e.g., Jorge R. Roig, Decoding First Amendment Coverage of Computer Source Code in the Age of YouTube, Facebook, and the Arab Spring, 68
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 319, 326 (2012) (“If a particular activity is found to
be . . . central to the development of a medium for the expression of ideas, then
the court must engage in a comprehensive analysis of First Amendment val-
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tates free speech, it is itself worthy of protection, even if source
111
code is not itself speech. The classic example is that of a mov112
ie projector. The possession of a movie projector is itself clearly not an expressive or communicative act. Nevertheless, “[i]f
the state were to prohibit the use of projectors without a license, First Amendment coverage would undoubtedly be trig113
gered.” Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has held that regulations
regarding the placement and designs of newspaper racks trig114
gered First Amendment concerns. Because source code, like
film projectors or newspaper racks, is central to the development of the medium of the Internet and all its component
communication technologies, it should likewise be protected
115
under the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech.
b. Arguments Opposing Free Speech Protection for Source
Code
Arguments against protection generally focus on rejecting
the expressive nature of source code. Specifically, the argument
takes the view that despite all the information source code may
contain, it is ultimately just a tool for some further, not neces116
sarily communicative, end.
There are two components to this “lack of expression” argument. First, source code is the implementation of an idea, ra117
ther than the expression of the idea itself. Put another way,
unlike books or films, “source code is fundamentally different

ues . . . .”); see also Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First
Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 716 (2000) (“[The First Amendment] extends to forms of interaction that realize First Amendment values.”).
111. Roig, supra note 110 (“Activities and devices that facilitate the development of a medium for the expression of ideas, though not themselves ‘expressive,’ trigger First Amendment coverage as readily as traditional
speech.”).
112. See, e.g., Post, supra note 110, at 717 (giving the movie projector example); Roig, supra note 110, at 341–42 (framing the discussion in terms of
Post’s example).
113. Post, supra note 110, at 717.
114. See Plain Dealer Publ’g Co. v. City of Lakewood, 794 F.2d 1139, 1143
(6th Cir. 1986) (holding regulations to limit placement and design were an unconstitutional prior restraint on the freedom of the press).
115. Roig, supra note 110, at 345.
116. See, e.g., Katherine A. Moerke, Free Speech to a Machine? Encryption
Software Source Code Is Not Constitutionally Protected “Speech” Under the
First Amendment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1007, 1042–47 (2000) (arguing source code
is not the expression of an idea, but merely the implementation of it).
117. Id. at 1044.
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from these examples, whose primary function is expression.
118
The function of source code is . . . to program a computer.”
Although this form of implementing the idea may convey some
information about the idea itself, “the First Amendment is not
119
so broad as to protect all implementation of ideas.” Building
off of this functionalist view of source code, the argument proceeds to analogize writing a computer program to building a
120
machine. Just as the building of certain devices may be restricted or outright prohibited without raising First Amend121
ment concerns, prohibiting the writing of particular types of
source code also does not trigger First Amendment concerns.
In summary, encryption backdoors raise First Amendment
questions because encryption software comes from source code,
which is arguably communicative. Past attempts to regulate
encryption have not resulted in a clear statement of whether
that protection actually exists, nor have they addressed how
mandated source code may differ from restraints on source
code. The following Part addresses both of these questions.
II. EVADING ENCRYPTION: HOW MANDATED
BACKDOORS IMPLICATE COMPELLED SPEECH
CONCERNS
Given the government’s history of regulating encryption,
one might be led to believe that present calls for companies to
include backdoors neatly fall into past treatment of encryption,
and, like past efforts, should be permitted under the First
Amendment, or at least be subject to similar analysis as export
control regulations. Although there is substantial overlap between encryption regulations of the past and proposals for
modern backdoors, requiring modern backdoors significantly
differs from encryption programs of the past in several key aspects. This Part examines these differences and overlaps, highlighting aspects that lead to different First Amendment analysis than in the past. It then analyzes those First Amendment
issues, showing how they play out for mandated software encryption backdoors.

118. Id.
119. Id. at 1045.
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 832(c) (2012) (prohibiting the building of a nuclear weapon).
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A. DISTINGUISHING MANDATED SOFTWARE BACKDOORS FROM
ENCRYPTION REGULATIONS OF THE PAST
As both calls for mandated backdoors and the programs
described in Part I.B.1 involve the regulation of encryption, it
may seem natural to assume that the legality of the present
program turns on the legality of those past programs. However,
though both past and present efforts involve the regulation of
encryption, they differ in several key aspects that impact a con122
stitutional analysis of calls for present-day regulation.
Past attempts to curtail the release of encryption technologies can be largely broken into two programs. The first is the
effort, beginning in the Cold War and continuing into the early
2000s, of the United States government to limit the exportation
123
of encryption machines and software. The second is the effort,
initiated in the early 1990s but largely abandoned by the middle of that decade, to get United States technology companies to
voluntarily integrate the Clipper Chip into their communica124
tions products. The former differs from present regulations by
applying only to software exports, while the latter differs because of its entirely voluntary nature.
The export ban of the second half of the twentieth century
is distinguishable from proposed encryption backdoors because
the export ban had a narrower focus. As the name suggests, the
125
export ban focused solely on exports. Although the constitu126
tionality of even this narrow scope is doubtful, assuming it is
a valid prior restraint on speech, the much broader applicability of encryption backdoors to all domestic products calls for an
independent analysis. This is both because the scope of the restriction is much larger (all products versus only exports) and
because the interests of law enforcement and the general public
likely receive different weights than they do in the export ban
context. Furthermore, although the export ban and backdoors
involve substantial overlap in regards to the free speech analysis that applies, the export ban was a prior restraint on
127
speech, while backdoors implicate compelled speech concerns.
As a result of these differences, the analysis of encryption
122. See infra Part III.A.
123. Diffie & Landau, supra note 49, at 728.
124. Levy, supra note 54.
125. See Diffie & Landau, supra note 49.
126. See, e.g., Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1310–11
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding unconstitutional several of the export controls).
127. Id. at 1310.
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backdoors involves considering a wider variety of law enforcement tools. There is only one way to stop the spread of information: limiting the communication of that information. However, there are several ways to gain access to information
128
beyond requiring broad encryption backdoors.
Turning to the Clipper Chip, mandatory encryption backdoors are fundamentally different than the voluntary Clipper
Chip encryption “solution” suggested in the 1990s. Unlike present calls for “mandatory” backdoors, the Clipper Chip program
129
was never required. Instead, it was billed as an optional tool
for companies to easily integrate encryption into their prod130
ucts. Given this entirely optional nature, the Clipper Chip
raised none of the compelled speech issues that backdoors raise.
As a result of these differences between both the export control
programs and the Clipper Chip, legal analysis of these past
programs does not necessarily imply similar results for a modern backdoor mandate.
B. ANALYZING WHETHER SOURCE CODE CONSTITUTES SPEECH
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Despite the differences outlined above, modern calls for encryption backdoors and the export restrictions of the past do
have one thing in common: both seek to regulate computer
131
source code. Whether or not source code is even protected by
the First Amendment has been a point of contention since the
late 1990s, and the courts of that era never came to a uniform
132
conclusion. Furthermore, with the end of the export ban in
128. See infra Part III.B (discussing how investigators can gain access to
communications without infringing on the First Amendment).
129. Compare Shane Harris, Feds Want ‘Backdoor’ into Phones, While Terrorists Walk Through Front Door, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www
.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/30/feds-want-backdoor-into-phones
-while-terrorists-walk-through-front-door.html (noting renewed calls to restrict encryption technology), with Levy, supra note 54 (noting the voluntary
nature of the Clipper Chip).
130. Levy, supra note 54.
131. Compare Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1306 (analyzing the exportation of
source code), with Trevor Timm, Weak Encryption Won’t Defeat Terrorists —
But It Will Enable Hackers, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/dec/10/weak-encryption-wont-defeat
-terrorists-but-it-will-enable-hackers (discussing encryption tool’s source code
regarding modern backdoors).
132. Compare Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1310–11 (finding export controls
unconstitutional), with Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C.
1996) (upholding export controls as constitutional).
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133

the early 2000s, the debate became largely academic. As a
starting point, First Amendment protection for source code is a
necessary condition for encryption backdoors to raise compelled
speech concerns. The debate over the applicability of the First
Amendment to source code continues to this day, with increased fervency as the Internet has come to play a significant
role in the average American’s life. This Section analyzes past
134
arguing that
commentators’ consideration of this issue,
source code ought to fall within the protections of the First
Amendment. Part I.C.2 introduced arguments both for and
against protecting source code under the First Amendment. An
analysis of these arguments indicates that source code ought to
be protected, though for different reasons in different cases.
As a starting point, it is fairly uncontroversial that if a
piece of source code is expressive, it should be protected. Even
writers that believe source code should not be protected agree
135
that if it was expressive, it would be worthy of protection.
Thus, in instances where source code is intended to communicate an idea, source code should be protected as itself communicating that idea.
In other instances, however, detractors are correct to point
out that source code was written not to communicate an idea,
but entirely as a tool to enable a machine to carry out a task. In
these instances, the “expressive content” argument in favor of
First Amendment protection does not stand up to scrutiny.
However, it can be very difficult to distinguish the purpose for
136
which a particular piece of source code was written. Nevertheless, assuming the purpose can be distinguished, in cases
where a solely non-communicative purpose can be determined,
advocates for First Amendment protection can fall back to the
“First Amendment Values” argument, which, in the context of
source code for communication products (which encryption
clearly falls into), will almost universally be persuasive.

133. See Diffie & Landau, supra note 49, at 732–33.
134. See supra Part I.C.2 (introducing these issues).
135. See, e.g., Moerke, supra note 116, at 1029 (suggesting that if source
code was “written to make a statement” it would be protected speech).
136. This difficulty is discussed in more detail in a later paragraph in this
Section.
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1. The “Expressive Content” Argument Covers Most Source
Code
When the First Amendment classification of source code
was last considered in earnest, Internet usage was in its infan137
cy. In 1997, less than half the country had Internet access in
138
the home. Groups advocating for the publishing of source
code were uncommon at that time. For example, the Open
Source Initiative, a leading group in such advocacy, was not
139
founded until 1998. As a result, it (perhaps) made sense to
say that source code was non-communicative at that time, because it was unlikely that source code would be communicated
to a large audience. This is no longer the case. Though developers may publish source code for many reasons, one reason is to
140
“understand [a program’s] functioning.” Such a goal suggests
that the source code itself, even if it is the particular implementation of an idea, still performs an educative function: teaching
other individuals how a computer program functions as well as
how they could implement it themselves. Such educative materials fall within the ambit of First Amendment protections and
141
thus cover open source software code.
This treatment of open source code, however, leaves a
noteworthy gap in the universe of source code’s protection.
First, although many of the encryption technologies at issue are
142
143
open source, the most well-known instance is not. Though
137. Cf. THOM FILE & CAMILLE RYAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013 1
(2014) (documenting the rise of Internet usage between the mid-1980s and
2013).
138. Id. at 4.
139. History of the OSI, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE (Sept. 2012), http://
opensource.org/history.
140. Richard Stallman, Why Free Software Is More Important Now than
Ever Before, WIRED (Sept. 28, 2013) (emphasis added), https://www.wired.com/
2013/09/why-free-software-is-more-important-now-than-ever-before.
141. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (finding First
Amendment coverage for things that teach doctrine).
142. Indeed, this open source nature limits the effectiveness of backdoor
regulations, even if the government could constitutionally mandate them. See
Timm, supra note 131.
143. Specifically, Apple’s iMessage system, which encrypts messages sent
between two iPhone users, is not. See Daniel Eran Dilger, EFF Ranks Apple’s
iMessage, FaceTime “Best Mass Market Options” for Secure Messaging, Ahead
of BlackBerry Messenger, Google Hangouts, Facebook, Microsoft Skype,
APPLEINSIDER (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.appleinsider.com/articles/14/11/05/
eff-ranks-apples-imessage-facetime-best-mass-market-options-for-secure
-messaging-ahead-of-blackberry-messenger-google-hangouts-facebook
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the First Amendment applies to intrusions into the internal
144
writings of a group just as much as to public writings, there
still remains a gap in code covered by the First Amendment:
source code that is not intended to be communicative. The argument against treating source code as expressive carries the
most weight at this point: if the source code is not intended to
convey information to others, then it does not seem plausible to
say that it triggers any First Amendment concerns. Although
this line of reasoning has theoretical appeal, it presents a large
practical problem: How does one distinguish between expressive and non-expressive code? For small programs, it may be
possible to query the program author and simply ask their intentions. Such an approach for larger programs, however, is
implausible. The Linux kernel (the core component of many
major operating systems), for example, has had almost 12,000
145
developers contribute to its source code since 2005. Contacting each and every one of those developers would be an exercise
in futility. At best, a court could speculate as to developer intent, based on the nature of the software, its development philosophy, and any other indirect evidence that makes a particular intention more or less likely to be present in that particular
case. Such an approach, however, would necessarily be an approximation.
2. The “Free Speech Values” Argument Covers All Encryption
Software Not Addressed by the “Expressive Content” Argument
Even if this hurdle could be overcome, and every developer
could (truthfully) indicate that they did not intend to express
any idea when writing their code, there would still remain the
“free speech values” argument. Few writers have developed
counterarguments to this line of thought other than to merely
presume the negative—that constructions which facilitate
146
speech are not themselves protected by the First Amendment.
-microsoft-skype.
144. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (noting intrusion into “internal structure or affairs of an association” may impinge on First
Amendment freedoms (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623
(1984))).
145. JONATHAN CORBET ET AL., LINUX KERNEL DEVELOPMENT: HOW FAST
IS IT GOING, WHO IS DOING IT, WHAT ARE THEY DOING AND WHO IS SPONSORING THE WORK 2 (2015).
146. See, e.g., Ocrant, supra note 82, at 540 (stating that the “motors, levers, gears and wires” of a newspaper printer are not protected by the First
Amendment).
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Such a view, however, is unsupported by Supreme Court interpretations of the First Amendment, which have extended protection to activities beyond pure speech into “conduct commonly
147
associated with [speech].”
This combination of the “expressive content” argument and
the “free speech values” argument collectively bring most
source code within the coverage of the First Amendment. Nevertheless, such a rationalization for protection will still not protect all source code, but rather only source code that is intended
as communicative or related to communications. This leaves a
noteworthy gap, specifically for non-communicative devices.
Though such a gap may seem problematic for First Amendment
protection at first glance, in reality, its effect is very minimal as
regards the present encryption backdoor debate. Thus far, the
information sought by law enforcement has been chiefly com148
munications. Thus, for the purposes of the present description of encryption backdoors, the combination of the two arguments covers all the source code at issue.
In summary, in the Internet-connected age, source code
will generally be expressive enough to warrant potential First
Amendment protection, because much of source code, though
written primarily to control a computer, is also written with the
goal of communicating valuable information to other developers. Furthermore, to the extent a particular piece of code is not
expressive, in the communication context (with which encryption is necessarily concerned) its potential for protection will
still be supported by the “Free Speech Values” argument, as
source code that makes encryption possible is a tool that readily contributes to making the communication of expressive content possible.
C. ANALYZING BROAD BACKDOORS: STRICT SCRUTINY DOES NOT
PERMIT UNIVERSAL BACKDOORS
Given that source code falls within the protection of the
First Amendment, this Section examines whether or not laws
requiring backdoor implementation would nevertheless be
permissible. Applying the First Amendment jurisprudence described in Section I.C, it concludes that universal encryption
backdoors as desired by individuals like the FBI Director would

147. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988).
148. See Thomas, supra note 2 (noting the FBI was being challenged by
“encrypted communications” (emphasis added)).
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impermissibly require compelled speech even in the presence of
a specific “clear and present danger.”
Just because source code is protectable by the First
Amendment does not mean that compelled encryption backdoors are necessarily unconstitutional. In the prior restraint
arena, for instance, content such as child pornography has triggered a First Amendment analysis, but prohibiting its distribu149
tion was constitutionally permitted nevertheless. This Part
first analyzes what level of scrutiny should be applied to encryption backdoors, and then, having concluded that strict
scrutiny applies, argues that under no circumstances would the
broad-sweeping backdoors being sought be permitted under the
First Amendment.
1. Strict Scrutiny Applies to Encryption Backdoors
As noted in Part I.C.1, the Constitution provides a range of
standards to apply when evaluating regulation of speech. As an
initial matter, source code clearly does not fall within the
treatment of the commercial speech doctrine. Commercial
speech is limited to speech that “does no more than propose a
150
commercial transaction.” Source code is not such a proposal,
but rather instructions on how to perform a particular task.
Additionally, strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny ap151
plies unless the content of speech is worthless to society.
Communicating how to implement strong encryption has worth
to society. Without it, the development secure software would
be greatly hindered, and everything from bank records to medi152
cal information would be vulnerable to attack.
The more interesting (and difficult) question is whether
regulations of encryption source code should receive intermedi-

149. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982).
150. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001).
151. Ocrant, supra note 82 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
400 (1992) (White, J., concurring)).
152. See Cory Doctorow, Encryption Won’t Work If It Has a Back Door Only
the ‘Good Guys’ Have Keys to, THE GUARDIAN (May 1, 2015), https://www
.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/01/encryption-wont-work-if-it-has-a
-back-door-only-the-good-guys-have-keys-to. But see Ocrant, supra note 82, at
542. After arguing that source code should not receive any protection, Ocrant
concedes that if it is protected, regulations of source code should receive only
minimal scrutiny. Id. This argument is based, however, on the reasoning that
because it should not receive strict or intermediate scrutiny, it must default to
minimal scrutiny. Id. at 541–42. Ocrant does not analyze what makes encryption source code “worthless to society.” See id. at 542.
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ate scrutiny or strict scrutiny. In cases of restraints on speech,
the “principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech be153
cause of disagreement with the message it conveys.” Compelled speech, however, adds a wrinkle to this inquiry, because
the government is not trying to censor a message with which it
disagrees, but rather trying to modify the message to suit the
government’s own end. Nevertheless, the Court has been clear
that the same level of scrutiny applies to compelled speech as to
154
compelled silence (prior restraints). The inquiry, therefore,
when the government is attempting to compel a particular
message, could be characterized as whether the government
has adopted a regulation requiring speech because the government seeks to force the conveyance of a particular message.
There is not a straightforward answer to this question. No
court has directly addressed the issue of compelled source code
speech, and those that have addressed the issue of restraints on
155
source code speech have come out on both sides. Here the distinction between prior restraints of the past and the compelled
nature of backdoors today comes into play. Unlike the prior restraint at issue in Bernstein, encryption backdoors would require the expression of a particular idea, specifically “this is
how you encrypt information and here is a backdoor to allow
the government access to that information.” The emphasized
portion is a particular message that the software author (presumably) does not wish to convey, but is being compelled to do
so by government regulation. This makes such regulation content-specific, as it is a regulation based on “[agreement or disa156
greement] with the message it conveys.”
153. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
154. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781,
796–97 (1988) (“There is certainly some difference between compelled speech
and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is
without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech, a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say
and what not to say.”).
155. Compare Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1996)
(finding export restriction to be a content-neutral regulation because “[t]he defendants are not regulating the export of the diskette because of the expressive content of the comments and or source code, but . . . because of the belief
that . . . it [is] easier for foreign intelligence sources to encode their communications”), with Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1307 (N.D.
Cal. 1997) (finding export restriction to be subject to strict scrutiny).
156. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (quoting Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
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As a content specific regulation, encryption backdoors must
withstand strict scrutiny. Such regulations must “promote a
compelling interest” through “the least restrictive means to fur157
ther the articulated interest.” Although not free from doubt,
there is a likely a compelling interest in requiring encryption
158
backdoors, because they have the potential to reduce crime.
This doubt arises because there is at least some reason to believe that requiring encryption backdoors would have little to
159
no effect on the actual encryption used by criminals. It may
be the case that if encryption backdoors are implemented into
products made by companies responsive to regulation, criminals would simply move to using tools from darker parts of the
160
Internet that are less responsive to regulation. Nevertheless,
while the extent to which such regulation would be effective is
questionable, it would likely have at least some margin of impact. For example, in November 2015 terrorists in France coordinated their attack (ultimately killing 130 people) using unencrypted text messages that could have been intercepted without
161
any encryption backdoors, but one can easily imagine them
162
using encrypted iMessages instead, just as the San Bernardino attackers did. If that had been the case, then only with
backdoors present would the government have been able to intercept their messages.

157. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
158. See David Auerbach, There Is No Good Argument for Encryption
Backdoors, SLATE (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/
bitwise/2015/11/encryption_backdoors_won_t_make_us_safer_from_terrorism_
john_brennan_john.html.
159. See id. (“If secure encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have secure encryption.”). Although only tangential to a constitutionality discussion,
as a practical matter, it is of significant, if not overriding, importance that
were encryption backdoors actually implemented, criminals of any skill would
simply shift to using already-existing open source programs that do not have
any backdoors. See id.
160. See id.
161. Dan Froomkin, Signs Point to Unencrypted Communications Between
Terror Suspects, THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 18, 2015), https://theintercept.com/
2015/11/18/signs-point-to-unencrypted-communications-between-terror
-suspects.
162. Cf. Mike Elgan, Why It’s Time for Apple To Open FaceTime, CULT OF
MAC (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.cultofmac.com/247673/why-its-time-for-apple
-to-open-facetime (noting users could switch between SMS and iMessage
“without thinking about it”).
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2. Broad Encryption Backdoors Do Not Survive a Strict
Scrutiny Analysis
Despite promoting a compelling government interest, widesweeping encryption backdoors meet a fatal flaw when considering whether or not they are narrowly tailored to achieve the
government’s interest. Every day, over six-billion text messages
163
are sent. The vast majority of these communications are (one
would hope) not communications between terrorists. Nevertheless, each and every one of these communications would be subject to backdoor access. Putting aside the massive privacy con164
cerns that has the potential to raise, such access is not
“narrowly tailored” to achieve the government’s interest. In a
related context, the Supreme Court has struck down laws restricting speech on the basis that they were not narrowly tailored to preventing “advocacy . . . directed to inciting or produc165
ing imminent lawless action.” Similarly, in the context of
encryption backdoors, any effective law requiring the installation of backdoors would invade into the sphere of communications where there is no government interest in having backdoor
access. To pass constitutional muster, the law would have to be
so narrow as to be of very limited effect in gaining access to
communications, but in order to be effective, the law would necessitate adding backdoor access to communications where
there is no compelling government interest.
III. CONFRONTING COMPULSION: HOW COURTS AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT SHOULD TREAT REQUESTS FOR
ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS
Given that source code falls within the protection of the
First Amendment, this Part examines what means are left to
investigators for accessing encrypted information. Although
laws requiring broad backdoors would likely violate the First
Amendment, there are strong public policy considerations favoring alternatives that would support law enforcement objec163. Michael O’Grady, SMS Usage Remains Strong in the US: 6 Billion
SMS Messages Are Sent Each Day, FORRESTER (June 19, 2012), http://www
.blogs.forrester.com/michael_ogrady/12-06-19sms_usage_remains_strong_in_
the_us_6_billion_sms_messages_are_sent_each_day.
164. See generally Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy,
Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 359 (2010) (discussing the privacy implications of government backdoors).
165. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
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tives requiring access to encrypted information. This Part presents two technological solutions that pass First Amendment
muster, as well as an acknowledgement that in at least some
circumstances, law enforcement may be left, as in the case of
encryption and the Fifth Amendment, with having to make do
without the information desired. This Part then makes several
preliminary suggestions for a statutory framework that could
implement the stronger of these two solutions, and concludes
by addressing counterarguments to the proposed solution.
A. WHAT’S AN INVESTIGATOR TO DO? GETTING AT
COMMUNICATIONS WITHOUT VIOLATING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In light of the preceding discussion, it may appear that investigators are stuck between a rock and a hard place. Backdoors would either be too constrained to be effective or too
broad to be constitutional. However, there are responses to this
dilemma that satisfy both technological and constitutional requirements. This Section introduces some of these possible solutions. Notably, the solutions proposed are somewhat consistent with the draft Compliance with Court Orders Act of
166
2016 language, at least as I interpret it. The solutions below
do not require changes to a company’s product en masse, but do
require steps to be taken in particular circumstances. Although
they admittedly do not provide the coverage that comprehensive encryption backdoors would provide, these solutions may
serve as a starting point for examining further tools that would
aid law enforcement while still respecting the boundaries put
in place by the Constitution.
1. Permitted Compelled Speech: Utilize Existing
Technological Limitations in Encryption Products To Obtain
the Desired Information on an Individual Basis
Although the encryption of a communication may be unbreakable, attempting to insert backdoors to make it breakable
167
is not the only way to gain access to communications. There
166. See supra note 71 (discussing differing interpretations). Note that under the reading some other authors have given the draft language, the proposed solutions would not be consistent with the Act, as they read the Act as
mandating universal backdoors, which, as discussed supra, are not permissible under the First Amendment.
167. For example, it is possible to trick someone into downloading what
appears to be a software update, but what in actuality is a program that intercepts communications before they are encrypted. See, e.g., Michael Kassner,
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are other ways of gaining access to information stored on an
encrypted device that can be more narrowly tailored, so as to
pass the strict scrutiny of the First Amendment. What follows
168
are two possible responses targeted at the iPhone that would
satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement. Under circumstances
where probable cause exists, a court could order a company to
take either of the proceeding actions to assist in carrying out a
warrant, without running against the First Amendment.
a. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: Intercepting “Live”
Communications
The first vulnerability law enforcement could use to obtain
live access to communications is a man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attack. This vulnerability is so named because the interceptor
“stands” in the middle of the two communicating parties, deceiving both the sender into believing the message is going directly to the recipient and the receiver into believing the mes169
sage is coming directly from the sender. In the case of a
system like iMessage, because Apple controls its encryption key
infrastructure, it could surreptitiously use encryption keys provided by the government to effect its encryption, with the send-

Malware Poses as Software Updates: Why the FBI Is Warning Travelers,
TECHREPUBLIC (May 14, 2012, 12:55 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it
-security/malware-poses-as-software-updates-why-the-fbi-is-warning
-travelers.
168. This discussion centers on the iPhone given its prominence in news
coverage regarding law enforcement access to encrypted information. These
forms of intercept could be converted to other communications media, subject
to the caveats described in the discussion.
169. TOM’S GUIDE Staff & Ryan Goodrich, What Is a Man in the Middle Attack?, TOM’S GUIDE (Oct. 23, 2013), http://tomsguide.com/us/man-in-the
-middle-attack,news-17755.html. To go into a bit more detail, suppose Eve
wants to intercept a message sent from Alice to Bob. Ordinarily, Alice would
be able to send a secure message to Bob by finding Bob’s public key, using that
key to encrypt her message, and then sending the message to Bob. Only Bob
would be able to decrypt the message, by using his private key. In an MITM
attack, Eve impersonates Bob (generally by having a privileged position such
that when Alice looks online for Bob’s public key, she unknowingly gets Eve’s
instead). Then when Alice encrypts her message, she uses Eve’s key instead of
Bob’s. Eve intercepts the message in transit, and because it was encrypted
with her public key, Eve can use her private key to decrypt it. After reading
the message, Eve can re-encrypt the message using Bob’s real public key and
send the message onto him, with neither Alice nor Bob any the wiser. See Matthew Copeland et al., The GNU Privacy Handbook, GNUPG (1999), https://
www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html (discussing information utilized in the
example under the chapter 3 heading).
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170

er and receiver being none the wiser. Doing this for all iPhone
users would raise the same narrow tailoring concerns as broad
encryption backdoors. However, for specific individuals (based
on information that the individual’s communications are related to a criminal investigation sufficient to allow a warrant to
issue) such an approach would not raise overbreadth concerns.
It is, however, worth noting that while such an approach would
grant access to systems like iMessage, where there is some central authority managing the encryption key infrastructure, it
171
would be inapplicable to a distributed key system. Additionally, such an attack would be capable of intercepting only communications sent from the point in time when the man-in-the172
middle position is established. Unless past communications
were sent over the (now compromised) channel, there would be
173
no way to intercept them.
b. Custom-Crafted Updates: Compelled Speech That Is
Sufficiently Narrowly Tailored
As a result of the aforementioned limitations, law enforcement may desire additional tools to access communications that
a man-in-the-middle attack does not cover. Fortunately for
them, Apple’s (and other cellphone vendor’s) privileged position
provides such a solution. As the operating system developer for
the iPhone, Apple has a great deal of control over the software
on it, including the software updates. On other platforms, malicious software updates have been used to compromise computer
174
security integrity. Given the closed nature of iOS, Apple could
implement such an update either without any notification to
170. See Dennis Fisher, Apple iMessage open to Man in the Middle, Spoofing Attacks, THREATPOST (Oct. 17, 2013), https://threatpost.com/apple
-imessage-open-to-man-in-the-middle-spoofing-attacks/102610; see also supra
Part I.A.2 (discussing the technicalities of encryption key systems). Replace
Alice, Bob, and Eve with iPhone User 1, iPhone User 2, and Apple, respectively, in the example supra note 169, and that example is precisely what the government could require.
171. This approach is inapplicable because such an MITM attack relies on
the privileged position of the directory operator to be able to transparently alter the public keys it provides when people request them. See Fisher, supra
note 170 (noting that systems “without a central directory” would not be vulnerable to this type of attack).
172. See TOM’S GUIDE Staff & Goodrich, supra note 169 (noting that manin-the-middle attacks are limited to communications exchanged after the relay
between the two parties is established).
173. See id.
174. Kassner, supra note 167.
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the user or as an innocuous update that hides its true pur175
pose. Once installed, such an update could grant access to
past encrypted communications, as well as any other infor176
mation saved on the phone. As was the case with man-in-themiddle attacks, while such action may raise broadness problems if applied to all users, when only requested for specific individuals, such an attack likely satisfies the narrow tailoring
177
requirements of the First Amendment.
2. Beyond Compelled Speech: Find Other Ways To Get the
Information or Do Without It
Although the suggestions above provide some possibilities
for access to encrypted information, they are still imperfect solutions. Both rely on the privileged position of a particular party in order to gain access to communications, and, as the examples make clear, that privileged position simply does not exist
for all communications. In such cases, it may simply be the case
that an investigator must make do with the information obtainable by constitutional means, just as is the case with more
traditional forms of evidence gathering.
The reality that some evidence is simply beyond the constitutional reach of investigators is not a new idea. Indeed, despite computer encryption’s relative novelty, there are already
several cases in the Fifth Amendment context from which to
178
draw parallels in regards to access to encrypted information.
These cases support the view that when it comes to encryption,
there may simply be some cases where investigators cannot get

175. Cf. J. O’Dell, Linux Chief: ‘Open Source Is Safer, and Linux Is More
Secure than Any Other OS’ (Exclusive), VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 26, 2013), http://
venturebeat.com/2013/11/26/linux-chief-open-source-is-safer-and-linux-is-more
-secure-than-any-other-os-exclusive/ (noting that closed source programs are
vulnerable to having backdoors implemented without consumer knowledge).
176. See Juli Clover, ‘Masque Attack’ Vulnerability Allows Malicious ThirdParty iOS Apps To Masquerade as Legitimate Apps, MACRUMORS
(Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.macrumors.com/2014/11/10/masque-attack-iosvulnerability.
177. Of course, such an attack would also have to satisfy the privacy requirements of the Fourth Amendment, as well as the statutory requirements
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. See generally WILLIAM
MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 340–63 (2016) (discussing
the legal requirements for law enforcement to intercept electronic communications and access stored communications).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668–69
(E.D. Mich. 2010) (finding that compelling a defendant to reveal his encryption
password amounts to self-incrimination).
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at the information desired. Although circumstances have led to
179
alternative outcomes in some cases, in some instances, courts
have recognized that a defendant cannot be compelled to turn
over her password, even when the failure to do so effectively
180
cuts off a key source of information. Though law enforcement
181
can overcome this issue by granting a suspect immunity, in
some cases, only the primary key password holder may be the
person the government wants to charge. In such cases, the only
recourse is to seek the password information from another per182
son with knowledge of it.
Similarly, in regards to communication backdoors, if investigators are unhappy with the limited compelled speech options
constitutionally available to them, they must either find a permissible means of obtaining the information (through the permitted technical solutions described above or through less
technical means such as getting the suspect’s cooperation in accessing the encrypted information) or simply do without it. Furthermore, unlike the Fifth Amendment context, no grant of
immunity can remedy the situation. While such a grant allows
for the protection of the interests implicated by the Fifth
Amendment by preventing the disclosure or information derived from it from being used against the individual making the
183
statement, a grant of immunity does not resolve the First
Amendment issue. Grants of immunity do not protect the interest of a speaker being able to control the content of his or her
message, and thus, unlike in the context of the Fifth Amendment, they cannot convert an unconstitutional backdoor into a
constitutional one.
B. WORKING TOWARDS A TECHNICAL SOLUTION: STEPS TO TAKE
TOWARDS ACHIEVING NARROWLY TAILORED BACKDOORS
Of the two solutions proposed, narrowly tailored backdoors
would permit access to more information, allowing access not
179. See, e.g., United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D.
Colo. 2012) (noting that where “the government knows of the existence and
location of the computer’s files” there is no Fifth Amendment protection).
180. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25,
2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 2012) (recognizing a Fifth Amendment right to not turn over encryption password).
181. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 556 (4th Cir. 2007)
(upholding search of a computer conducted after defendant’s wife gave law enforcement the password).
183. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 (1956).
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just to communications transmitted after access is established
184
but also to past communications stored on a device. Thus,
when possible, narrowly tailored backdoors better services the
public interest law enforcement is attempting to vindicate
when it seeks to gain access to an encrypted device. This Section proposes statutory structure that would aim to make such
an access regime possible.
As a first step toward implementing the proposed solution,
Congress should work with technology companies and law enforcement to develop a formal structure for requesting device
access. Currently, no such framework exists, and, as law enforcement’s attempts to nevertheless force cooperation in the
185
San Bernardino case suggest, the absence of such a framework makes it difficult for law enforcement to easily gain access when needed and legitimizes technology companies’ con186
cerns about establishing bad precedent.
Determining the precise contours of this framework is beyond the scope of this Note, as it involves weighing such detailed concerns as industry costs, new technological developments, privacy concerns, and data transfer logistics well
beyond those discussed thus far. Nevertheless, a few broad key
features may be suggested. First, to conform with the narrow
tailoring requirement, device manufacturers should be able to
limit the backdoor they provide to a singular, specific device.
Perhaps this takes the form of custom crafting access based on
unique identifying information about the device, or perhaps it
involves law enforcement turning over the device to a manufacturer, so that the government never has possession of the backdoor mechanism itself. In either event, it is key that the manufacturer be able to maintain limits on the backdoor, as any
broader use beyond that required to resolve the “clear and present danger” of lack of access would go beyond the narrow requirements of the situation.
Second, it may be useful to base the foundation of this
framework on that laid out in other electronic search contexts.

184. See supra Part III.A.1.
185. See Krishnadev Calamur, Apple vs. the FBI, THE ATLANTIC (Feb.
17, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/02/apple-fbi-sanbernardino/463128/.
186. See id. (laying out both the government’s argument for the need of access and Apple’s concerns over what providing access in that particular case
would mean for future cases).
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For example, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act requires (under certain circumstances) not only a warrant, but
also that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and
have failed” before the government can intercept certain kinds
188
of communications. Such a system could go a long way towards limiting usage to only situations where backdoor access
is strictly necessary, as well as assuaging many of the privacy
concerns that could arise through attempts to bypass encryption.
C. RESPONDING TO COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: WHY A CASE-BYCASE BACKDOOR SCHEME MAKES SENSE
The proposed framework outlined in the proceeding Section
naturally raises critiques from technology firms, arguing that
any device access would weaken encryption for all, as well as
from law enforcement, arguing that the limits described mean
the proposed framework does not go far enough. This Section
examines and responds to these critiques.
1. Even Single-Device Access Would Weaken Device
Encryption Overall
From those in favor of strong encryption, a likely response
to this proposal is that it makes cellphone encryption weaker
189
overall. This argument is not without merit. As Apple points
out, “In the wrong hands, this software . . . would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical posses190
sion.” This response suggests, however, two key limitations
that would substantially reduce the risk of this harm occurring.
First, the software would have to fall into “the wrong hands.”
Such access could be minimized by taking the same security
measures Apple takes for its in-house testing of new software
and applying it to the backdoor software. Additionally, companies could store backdoors offline, ensuring that even if a company is hacked, those hackers will not gain access to the back191
door software. Although offline storage does not eliminate the
187. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).
189. See, e.g., Danny Yadron, Security Experts: FBI Asking Apple To Weaken Encryption Is ‘Path to Hell,’ THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www
.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/01/apple-fbi-encryption-fight-security
-experts-rsa.
190. Calamur, supra note 185.
191. Cf. Kurt L. Hudson, Offline Root Certification Authority (CA),
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risk of adverse access, it substantially increases the costs, to
the point of being prohibitive for all but the most powerful of
192
actors. This would ensure that neither hackers nor even governmental actors would be able to gain access to the backdoor
tools.
If this risk is still of great concern, however, companies
could independently develop a backdoor each time it is requested, and then destroy all copies of the backdoor tool after its use.
Though inefficient, this would ensure that such a tool was never existent for copying by rogue actors. Perhaps the statutory
scheme could even factor this in and require the government to
foot the cost. In this way, there would be no permanent backdoor for anyone to access, rather it would be ephemeral, existing only for a specific device and only long enough to get the
needed information off of that device.
2. Single-Device Access Would Still Permit Many Encrypted
Files To Remain Outside the Reach of Law Enforcement
While proponents of strong encryption may worry that
permitting single device backdoors would weaken security, law
enforcement may argue that such a system does not go far
enough. After all, while such a regime would grant access to
devices made by companies like Apple and Google, it would not
prevent the use of encryption beyond company control. For example, computer users could still download GPG (an opensource version of the PGP software discussed in Part I.A.2) and
use encryption not vulnerable to attacks from the privileged
position device manufacturers enjoy. Law enforcement may argue that to truly stop encryption from adversely impacting investigations and security, encryption which cannot be made to
fit into the framework described above should be made ille193
gal.

MICROSOFT (Sept. 25, 2015), http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/
articles/2900.offline-root-certification-authority-ca.aspx (describing proper
storage procedures for root certificate authorities, including offline storage).
192. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s
First Digital Weapon, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/
countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet (describing software that could attack Iranian
centrifuges despite those computers not being connected to the Internet).
193. See supra Part I.B. No law enforcement agency has actually been
making this argument since the 1990s (likely for the reasons discussed in the
following sentences), but it is a natural outgrowth of current calls to rein in
encryption, and is likely to resurface as part of that debate.
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The problem with this argument, however, is that a regula194
tion banning encryption would simply be unenforceable. Any
attempt to force open-source software developers to integrate
encryption backdoors (regardless of whether they be broad or
narrowly tailored) will simply lead to people who truly want
government-proof encryption to take the (publically available)
source code of those tools, remove the backdoor, and proceed as
they did before. Thus, while making unbreakable encryption illegal has intuitive perspective, as a practical matter such a law
could never be effectively enacted. To borrow a phrase from the
gun lobby, “when backdoor-proof encryption is outlawed, only
outlaws will use backdoor-proof encryption.”
In summary, although broad encryption backdoors meet
with First Amendment obstacles, law enforcement could use
multiple other tools that would allow access to a large portion
of communications without impinging on the First Amendment.
One such tool would be a narrowly tailored access framework,
used only in a case-by-case basis. Such a framework would allow access to many communications when law enforcement has
justification, while still addressing security concerns that technology firms and privacy advocates may raise.
CONCLUSION
As the Internet continues its pervasive growth into everyday life, encryption is going to be increasingly important, both
as a tool to ensure privacy and as a hurdle that law enforcement must overcome in their investigations. Although the access they may provide has obvious appeal, encryption backdoors are not a constitutionally acceptable solution to this
hurdle. For all the aid it may provide, broad encryption backdoors are not reconcilable with the First Amendment. Such a
requirement would constitute compelled speech, which is permitted only in the presence of a “clear and present danger,” not
present in all the cases to which the requirement would apply.
Despite this apparent problem, this does not leave law enforcement bereft of tools to obtain encrypted communication information. Using other means of information acquisition, law
194. See Andrew Charlesworth, Munitions, Wiretaps and MP3s: The
Changing Interface Between Privacy and Encryption Policy in the Information
Society, in THE HISTORY OF INFORMATION SECURITY 771, 782 (Karl de Leeuw
& Jan Bergstra eds., 2007) (“[C]ryptographic tools . . . were simply no longer
amenable to traditional export oversight and control means. . . . [C]ontaining
grey marketers and software pirates . . . was becoming impossible.”).
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enforcement can still gain access to a wide swath of communications information. By using tools that either do not require
any software writing on the part of technology companies, or by
limiting requests for backdoors to specific individuals, law enforcement can gain access to a significant portion of the information sought, without crossing the line drawn by the First
Amendment.

